A growing wave of low-cost drones is testing how the United States buys and fields weapons. The spread of disposable, precise systems is forcing a rethink of price, production, and risk. In a recent conversation, Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, outlined why the United States is losing ground and what it will take to keep up.
Pettyjohn described a clash between cheap, plentiful attack drones and high-end, reusable platforms. She argued that the economics of modern combat now favor mass and speed. The debate is timely as militaries watch current conflicts and race to adapt their own arsenals.
The cost equation flips
Pettyjohn’s first theme is about price. Small, expendable drones can be built for thousands of dollars. Many can carry sensors or munitions that threaten ships, armor, and air defenses that cost millions each. When cheap drones repeatedly force expensive systems to reveal and defend themselves, the side with lower unit costs can grind down the other.
The effect is not just about dollars. It is about tempo. Cheap systems can be produced and replaced fast. High-end platforms take years to build and train for. That gap creates constant pressure on inventories and budgets during a long fight.
Production and procurement lag demand
The second theme is industrial speed. Pettyjohn pointed to slow procurement cycles and limited surge capacity as core obstacles. Even when a new design works, moving from prototype to mass production can stall. Testing pipelines, contracting rules, and supply chains add months or years.
Those delays matter when the threat shifts quickly. Adversaries can copy tactics, reprogram software, and swap parts faster than traditional programs can respond. To match that pace, she said, the United States needs more flexible contracts, broader supplier bases, and repeatable designs that scale.
- Shorten the path from field test to bulk orders.
- Pre-fund long-lead parts and critical materials.
- Qualify multiple suppliers to avoid bottlenecks.
Concepts and countermeasures must mature together
The third theme is operational. Drones are not only hardware. They demand new tactics, training, and support. Units need to plan for dense airspace, electronic interference, and rapid losses. They also need layered defenses that mix jamming, decoys, guns, and missiles at different ranges.
Pettyjohn stressed that both sides iterate. As defenses improve, attackers change routes, altitudes, and control links. That cycle rewards forces that can test, learn, and field updates fast. It also calls for more “attritable” systems—good enough to fight today and cheap enough to lose.
Why this matters now
Conflicts seen over the past few years show how drones can spot, harass, and strike at scale. They complicate planning for ships at sea, armor on the move, and bases on land. For the United States and its partners, the lesson is clear: stockpiles and training must reflect higher loss rates and faster refresh cycles.
Pettyjohn framed the issue as a race between adaptation and inertia. The side that fields many capable systems, updates software often, and accepts smart losses can create dilemmas for more expensive forces. Failing to adjust procurement and doctrine risks attrition that is hard to replace.
What change could look like
Experts often point to a simple playbook that aligns with Pettyjohn’s analysis:
- Buy in bulk: Commit to multi-year purchases of low-cost air and surface drones.
- Standardize: Use common batteries, radios, and parts to simplify supply and repair.
- Experiment: Push rapid field trials with units, then scale what works within months.
- Train differently: Teach units to expect jamming, spoofing, and frequent equipment losses.
- Layer defenses: Mix electronic attack with guns and interceptors to cut costs per kill.
These steps trade some exquisite performance for speed and quantity. The goal is not to replace high-end systems but to protect them and stretch their reach.
That contrast, as Pettyjohn framed it, captures the core decision. If the United States cannot buy, build, and learn as fast as its rivals, costs will rise while options shrink.
The path ahead will be measured in delivery schedules, production lines, and training hours. The next test is whether procurement can shift from small pilots to large, repeatable orders. Readers should watch for multi-year contracts, broader supplier lists, and training changes that move drones—and counters—into everyday practice.